to remain with their *status quo ante* and without additions to their territories. They must have been disappointed at this, to use no stronger term, and it probably required the dangerous invasions of the Gauls in 225 and of Hannibal in 218 to frighten them into taking a more resigned view of Rome's hegemony.

Whatever the attitude of the Italians, the horizon of the Romans had undoubtedly widened. By the year 241 they no longer regarded the watershed of the northern Appennines as the natural boundary for Italy. In 266 they had made dependent allies of the Umbrians (?), Sarnates who lived on the northern slopes of that mountain barrier and who had once, so it was said, dominated both Mantua and Perusia. Rome may also have signed a treaty with Ravenna (another Umbrian community?) situated just to the south of the delta of the Po. Such activities showed that the Romans were already thinking of the Alps, rather than the Appennines, as the true bulwarks of Italy, a change of view imposed perhaps by the menace of the Cisalpine Gauls. As a consequence, once the First Punic War was over, the interval (240-219) down to the Second Punic War (218-201) was largely taken up with a systematic effort to subjugate Cisalpina.299

A direct initial thrust through the central passes of the north Appenine watershed seemed to the Romans both difficult and perilous, since they did not control the approaches to them. They therefore went around the extremities. At the western end hard skirmishing in the years after 241 won them control of the bay of Spezia and the port of Genoa in or near the territories of the Ligurian Apuani and Ingauni respectively. But it was at the eastern extremity that the really heavy fighting took place, against the Gallic Boii. Here Latin Ariminum guarded the gap around the mountains and allied Sarsina guarded the Mandrioli pass across them. The Romans also had a good base and starting point there in the so-called Ager Gallicus which they had seized c.280 and settled with virilane coloni c.232. Latin Spoletium (241), controlling the Valle di Spina and the Colfiorito pass over the central Appennines, ensured their communications with the region. The disunity of the Cisalpine populations was also in their favour, and they succeeded in winning over and making allies of the Cenomani and Veneti.300

The Boii, aided by the terrain, which, in the latter half of the third century, was still extremely difficult because of its dense forests and extensive marshes, proved dangerous foes. In 225, enlisting the support of the Insubres and of transalpine mercenaries (*quesati*), and possibly of some Taurini, they poured across the central passes of the north Appennine watershed, thereby avoiding Ariminum. They then advanced down the western coast of the peninsula almost to within striking distance of Rome.

This massive Gallic invasion is responsible for one of the most important documents of the Roman Republic. A list of the forces that Rome in her alarm planned to deploy should it become necessary is preserved by Polybius. It derives from Fabius Pictor, who actually served in 225, and reveals that in that year Rome could mobilize over half a million men of military age, of whom rather more than half were Latin or other allies.301

The crisis of 225 was possibly the first occasion that Rome sought to draw up a list of all the forces at her disposal. But whether that be the case or not, the compilation of the roster could not have been a simple or straightforward matter, for normally Rome did not supervise, much less conduct, any census in non-Roman Italy. Perhaps on this occasion each people was ordered to let the Roman consuls know the maximum number of its military effectives; but, if so, it is not easy to see how Rome could or would have been able to verify what was reported to her. The roster looks like an emergency makeshift and it may have been resented as a device for squeezing extra troops out of the Italian communities. Possibly it was a factor in the Capuan revolt nine years later and in the resistance of twelve Latin Colonies to Rome's insistent demand for men in 209.

In the event, the victory at Telamon ended the Gallic threat in 225. The Romans then took the bold decision to carry the war into the heart of Cisalpina by advancing from Ariminum. It was now that Flaminius enhanced his fame by crossing the Po to attack the Insubres in their homeland (223); and at about the same time M. Claudius Marcellus began his illustrious military career with victory over a motley host of Gauls at Clastidium (222). This opened the door to more distant Piemonte and the mountain strongholds of the Ligures and won for Marcellus himself the *spolia opima* because of his hand-to-hand defeat of Virdumarus, chiefman of the Anemares. These successes made the Romans masters of Cisalpina; and, the better to discharge the role, they began construction in 220 of a great military highway, the Via Flaminia, from Rome to Ariminum via the Scheggia pass and Fanum on the Adriatic coast.302 Another highway running north from Rome along the Tyrrenian coast may have been built even earlier than this, the Via Aurelia, named
perhaps after C. Aurelius Cotta, consul in 252 and 248 and censor in 241; but as it led into the difficult mountain country of Liguria, it was not as suitable as the Flaminia for troop movements to Cisalpine.

The Romans also followed their usual practice and expropriated a large tract of Cisalpine territory. On it they founded two large Latin Colonies in 218, Cremona and Placentia, on the northern and southern bank of the Po respectively. These colonies were well sited to prevent any renewed co-operation of Boii with Insubes and to keep attackers north of the river. The new colonies also provided some control of the approaches to the central passes across the north Appennine watershed. Rome, in effect, had extended her hegemony of Italy as far north as the river Po.

It was at this juncture, however, that Hannibal arrived to undo most of what Rome had achieved in upper Italy. She managed to retain Cremona and Placentia but very little else, and Hannibal was able to invade the peninsula proper.

Hannibal in the Second Punic War counted heavily on non-Roman Italy. Like that other great enemy of Rome, his contemporary Philip V of Macedon, he was reasonably well informed about Romano-Italian relations and hoped to make them serve his cause. He planned to shatter Rome’s system in Italy, not so much by capturing Italian cities (for he had no illusions about his inability to storm well-walled strongholds), but by persuading them to throw in their lot with him. Once he had isolated Rome and rendered her helpless, he would be able to impose his own Carthaginian peace. Hannibal was, in fact, hoping that by his victories over Rome he would undermine her morale and by his favours to Italians he would entice them to his side.

In Cisalpine Gaul this strategy was more than a little successful. From the moment of his arrival Insubes, Boii and Ligures supported him enthusiastically. In 216 the Boii annihilated L. Postumius Albinus and a Roman army in the Litian forest, and throughout the war, and even after it, Carthage continued to find Gauls and Ligures willing and eager to fight against Rome.303

In peninsular Italy, however, it was another story. South of the Pisa-Ariumum line not a single community could at first be induced to join Hannibal despite his spectacular triumphs at the river Trebia (218) and Lake Trasimene (217) and despite his victory parade through Campania after inflicting the latter disaster. It was not until he overwhelmed the Roman army at Cannae (216) that large-scale defection from Rome began.

Capua may not have been the first, but was certainly the most important peninsula community to go over to Hannibal, and it was at once joined by Atella, Calatia and the Sabatini, all in Campania. In Apulia Aecae, Arpi, and Herdonia and in the Sallentine peninsula Uzentum threw in their lot with him. Among the Samnite tribes, the Hirpini (led by the important settlement of Compsa) and the Caudini both defected; about the Carricini no record survives. Most of the Bruttii and very many Lucani followed suit.

Other Italians, if they did not actually revolt, began to waver, especially the Etruscans, on whose soil he had won his great victory at Trasimene. Rome thought it prudent to take hostages from Arretium and other Etruscan states as guarantees for their good behaviour, and throughout the war she regularly stationed one and sometimes two legions in Etruria. Perhaps it is significant that there is very little record of Etruscan states apart from Perusia supplying combat troops for Rome’s armies; and even the materiel they supplied may have been sent more out of prudence than goodwill. It is also to be noted that individual Etruscans are known to have fought for Hannibal. Umbria also needed watching by Rome. Obviously in peninsular Italy lukewarm irresolution, if not positive rebellion, was sufficiently widespread to cause considerable concern.304

Nevertheless, the universal revolt that Hannibal was hoping for did not materialize. In fact, no tribe or community went over to him in its entirety except in Campania and the far south. Latium, central Italy, Picenum, most of the ports, and the Nomen Latium everywhere made no move to support him; and in the upshot neither did Umbria or even Etruria. Concluding that he could expect no help from the northern and central regions of the peninsula, Hannibal never visited them again after Cannae except for his brief diversionary feint at Rome in 211 in a futile attempt to relieve Roman pressure on Capua. He could not persuade, and he lacked the power to dragoon them.

To compound his disappointment even Campania and the south were far from whole-hearted in their support of him. In Campania Cumae, Nola, Nuceria and Acerrae remained firmly loyal to Rome no matter what it cost them, and for Nuceria and Acerrae the cost was high. On the borders of Campania Teanum Sidicinum stood
firm for Rome and Caiafa parted company with its fellow Caedini by refusing to join Hannibal. Further south, some of the Lucani stayed with Rome. So did many Bruttii: Petelia and Consentia actually held out against him with desperate courage for as long as they could. Amongst the Samnites the most powerful tribe, the Pentri, remained loyal to Rome despite the hardships that this entailed. The Frentani, including Larinum, also stood by Rome; and apparently so did Teanum Apulum and Canusium among the Apuli. The Messapii, exposed like the Bruttii to his full might and fury, did prudently give him aid, and some of them actually volunteered their services to him. But even the Messapii for the most part acted only under duress. This was also true of the turbulent Iliotenes who, generally speaking, joined him only with reluctance, justifiably fearing that, if they did not, he would let loose the dreaded Bruttii upon them.305

It was in the Oscan-speaking districts that Hannibal found his greatest support; but even there it was far from fervent and usually due to his looming presence. Communities joined him lest he destroy either them or their harvests. Hannibal must have been sorely disappointed with the Italian response to his overtures, all the more so since the communities that did go over to him did so grudgingly, whereas those loyal to Rome displayed almost incredible stout-heartedness. Capua supported Hannibal with at best lukewarm conviction; Petelia resisted him with unyielding resolution. Wherever his troops went they found a sullen and chilly reception and sometimes scorched earth; Rome's troops could count on aid and comfort everywhere. Clearly morale was on the side of Rome.

It is no exaggeration to say that Rome was saved because of the help she received from her Latin and Italian allies; and it is worth recording, even if the surviving literature which embodies the Roman tradition is little concerned to publicize it.306

Appian is probably exaggerating when he says that Italy fielded twice as many men as Rome herself.307 But Italy did almost certainly supply more than half the troops opposing Hannibal, and some of them were of excellent quality. The Nomen Latium and the mid-Italic region provided exceptionally good soldiers. It was a contingent of Pentri Samnites who inflicted the first defeat (admittedly a minor one) upon Hannibal in the field; and the sources refer repeatedly to the feats of Latini, the Paegnian cohort, and the soldiers of other tribes. Even the Etruscans fielded some combat troops, although their quality was not always reliable.

Rome got more than fighting men from Italy. The strongholds of the peninsula were placed at her disposal and she put them to good use. In Cisalpine the Latin Colonies Placentia, Cremona and Ariminum, in the centre Etruscan Arretium, and in the south Campanian Suessula and Latin Beneventum, Luceria and Venusia were powerful bastions.308 Other places provided shelter and comfort for Roman troops: Apulian Canusium, for instance, gave asylum to the remnants from Cannae. Nor were Bruttian Petelia and Campanian Accretae alone in their defiance of Hannibal: Latin Spoletium, Italiote Tarentum (its citadel at least), Campanian Nola, Apulian Salapia and other places were similarly resolute.

Italian loyalty can hardly be attributed to affection for Rome or even at this stage to 'national Italian patriotism'.309 Time and habit had not yet fully reconciled the Italians to their dependent status, much less imbued them with a Roman outlook. Nor had the seeds of pan-Italian patriotism sown by Brennus and Pyrrhus burgeoned as yet into mature and robust growth. The year 209 made that clear. By then Hannibal's worst seemed definitely over. Sicily, Capua and other centres had been recovered; the situation in Spain was well in hand; Hannibal was confined to the deep south; and Hasdrubal had not yet arrived in the north from Spain. For the second year in a row the outlook was sufficiently reassuring for Rome to make do with fewer legions, twenty-one in 210 and 209 as against twenty-five in 211. With such a combination of favourable circumstances Italian particularism promptly revived, even amongst Rome's closest allies: in 209 twelve of the Latin Colonies refused her further military aid on the ground that they were exhausted.310 It was perhaps fortunate for Rome that Hasdrubal reached Italy shortly afterwards, for the alarm that he aroused before his defeat and death in 207 prevented the movement started by the recusant twelve from spreading further.

The attitude of Rome's allies was based on self-interest, not pan-Italian patriotism. For all Hannibal's blandishments and temporary favours Italians were far from convinced that he either could or would promote their fortunes. A stranger from overseas, of alien ways and unintelligible speech, was hardly the one to correct those aspects of the Roman system that ranked most. He might guarantee, but was more likely to curtail their autonomy, and he was perfectly capable of inflicting his fearsome Gallic troops upon Italian
communities. Moreover, even if Hannibal were seriously intent on ameliorating the Italians' lot, his dispensations were not likely to be lasting. Sooner or later he would be gone: but the Romans would still be there, able and anxious to re impose their authority and to chastise those who had played them false.

This estimate of probabilities was dramatically confirmed in 211 when Rome recovered Capua and at once demonstrated that her power to punish exceeded Hannibal's to protect. Rome confiscated the entire Capuan territory (except apparently Casilinum), dismantled the Capuan state, executed the rebel ringleaders, and deprived all but two Capuans of various rights: some lost their property, others their freedom; the city itself was not razed, but it was reduced to the status of a mere pagus, tolerated because of its physical usefulness.311

After what happened to Capua Hannibal was able to retain communities only by force; and his force had become a wasting asset. Increasingly he found himself unable to prevent the Romans from recapturing communities that he had won over or brutally coerced. Even places of great symbolic prestige, such as Tarentum (209) and Locri (208), were retaken; and Hannibal, who did not shrink from terrorism when it suited his purpose (as at Nuceria in 216), now felt himself obliged to destroy captured or surrendered towns that he could not defend. This policy of despair robbed him of whatever scanty remnants of credic Italians might still be disposed to accord him. Their self-proclaimed champion had become the night-marish monster of his own dream, a scourge bringing rapine, death and destruction to the Italian countryside.312

Material considerations reinforced the calculating common sense of the Italians. During the half century before Hannibal's arrival the Romans had maintained law and order within the peninsula and had repulsed Punic, Illyrian and Gallic raiders attempting to assault it. This pax Romana was, of course, intended primarily to serve Roman interests. But Italians profited from it. By 218 widely dispersed settlements no longer needed to feel exposed and enhanced prosperity was general, for Italians as well as Romans. There must have been many, especially among the principes populi Romanorum, who were relatively contented with the state of affairs and grateful to Rome for their well-being. Even her secular Samnite enemies shared in the general betterment, to judge from the embellishment of the sanctuary at Pietrabondante.313 Roman hegemony guaranteed orderliness for the annual transhumance of Samnite flocks, a factor that may well have contributed to the decision of the Pentri to stand by Rome when the other Samnites (Caudini and Hirpini), less dependent on well-policéd drovers' trails, opted for Hannibal.

The Italians were also stiffened by the resolute nature of Rome's resistance to Hannibal. She might make heavy demands on them, but she imposed even greater burdens on herself. When extraordinary efforts were called for, Rome exerted herself to the utmost, fielding additional legions and shouldering grievous economic duties. The sturdiness of her example was a stimulant, and many an Italian joined the surviving consul from Cannae in refusing to despair of the Republic. Even Rome's enemies found her tenacity impressive.

But Hannibal's failure to smash the Roman system in Italy did not mean that he was without effect upon it. In fact, he altered it profoundly by helping to weld it more tightly together. His hammer blows did not destroy, but actually strengthened Rome's hegemony and removed it even further from challenge. Before he came, Rome and her allies had been tested in the First Punic War and in the Gallic invasion of 225. They now had to face a much sterner trial and they met it triumphantly.

To meet the succession of emergencies at the start of the war Rome acted with resolve and vigour. She moved swiftly for the common good and took far-reaching decisions without much, if indeed any, consultation with her Latin and Italian allies. There was, in fact, no time for that, and the allies acquiesced.

The dependent status of the allies would hardly have permitted them to protest against this Roman assumption of authority in any case. But in all likelihood they were not disposed to challenge it. Most of them must have recognized that this was no time for constitutional quibbling. The enormity of the menace imposed passive acceptance of Rome's orders. The inevitable consequence, of course, was growing encroachment by Rome upon allied rights.

This was perhaps neither foreseen nor intended, but it was none the less real, and it was not confined to military and political matters. Rome's direction of the war effort affected all aspects of Italian life. In the economic sphere ultimate decisions concerning the mobilization of resources and the payment therefor were bound to rest with the Romans. But even in cultural and social affairs, where Roman pressure could conceivably have been less, the consciousness
of the Italians that their own conduct must not be too aberrant from the Roman tendency to promote conformity. Thus, far from splitting Romans and Italians apart, Hannibal helped to bring them together, and he left behind him more 'national Italian patriotism' than he found.

The increased Roman influence on the economy of Italy is easy to detect. Even in prehistoric times the land had been thickly dotted with human settlements whose geographical proximity to one another promoted mercantile exchanges. Rome's expansion over the peninsula intensified this intermingling of the economies of the Italian settlements. Hannibal's invasion distorted the pattern of this age-old interdependence. The devastation of some districts, the enemy occupation of others, the diversion of men and resources to serve the needs of war, the interruption of imports, and the break in agriculture brought chaos to the established routines of everyday life and disrupted normal channels of trade. The ultimate beneficiary was Rome, for it fell upon her as the directing state to play the leading role in preventing an economic collapse. She did so very largely by harnessing as far as possible the activities of her hard-pressed allies to her own, and thus ensured that the economic effort matched the military.

The general belief that economic considerations played a rather small part in shaping the policies of the Roman Republic is no warrant for believing that Rome's leaders were utterly oblivious to them, least of all when faced with a crisis of Hannibalic proportions. Unprecedented in its magnitude and immediacy, it called for incomparably higher expenditures of money, as well as men, than the First Punic War, and Roman ingenuity and stamina were taxed to the limit by the difficulty of finding the needed resources, with Hannibal spreading havoc in Italy and his allies interrupting supplies from abroad.

Strenuous efforts must also have been demanded of the Italians, who had to raise, outfit, pay and maintain the troops they fielded, while at the same time making provision for home defence. The sources occasionally mention the economic contribution they made, but more usually ignore it. They concern themselves with the efforts made by Rome.

These in truth were determined enough. Rome did not, of course, mobilize resources with the totalitarian single-mindedness of modern states when they go to war. In third-century Italy the economy, and men's understanding of it, were too simple and rudimentary for that. Rome had not yet learned to finance war by mobilizing the credit of the state and leaving actual payment for later generations to worry about, although it is to be noted that for some operations in the Second Punic War she did resort to borrowing. In general, Rome, and no doubt the other states of Italy too, had to pay for the war as it was being fought. Somehow hard cash, actual coins, had to be found to maintain government, to provide essential supplies and services, and to safeguard state security. Among the devices to which Rome resorted was the doubling of the tributum in 215 and the exacting of special contributions from the well-to-do a year later.

The coins themselves supply evidence of the enormous financial drain. When the war began Rome was still using the same kind of currency as sixty years earlier. The unit of reckoning, as in other central Italian states, was a clumsy and ponderous coin, the so-called libral as, weighing one Roman pound (= twelve Roman ounces). In the south, however, and especially in Magna Graecia, these crudely cast pieces were not very acceptable, since struck coins of precious metal had long been common there. For these districts, therefore, Rome had silver didrachms put into circulation early in the third century: they were stamped ROMANO and weighed about six Roman scruples. But they were probably neither minted in Rome nor regarded as forming part of her native currency system. The long First Punic War had surprisingly little deleterious effect on Rome's coinage, and once it was over the Roman treasury was strengthened by the reparations payments from Carthage and tribute from Illyria. Thus, when the Second Punic War broke out, the official Roman currency unit was still the bronze libral as, and Rome was also still issuing silver didrachms (now inscribed ROMA and called quadrigatus) for use in Illyriote regions.

The system could not, however, long withstand the encounter with Hannibal. His war gobbled up huge amounts of metal, for all sorts of purposes besides minting. Bronze, for instance, was needed for weapons as well as coins and was at once in short supply. Silver, too, soon became scarce: Carthage in the west and Macedon in the east prevented supplies of that metal from reaching Italy. The Romans had no option but to tinker with the currency. During the first seven years of the conflict they halved the size and weight of the as no less than three times. This brought the weight of the coin down
from twelve ounces (324 grammes) in 218 to two ounces (54 grammes) in 211.\textsuperscript{336} Its ostensible value, of course, remained unchanged. For silver the stringency was worse and debasement of the metal in the \textit{quadrigatus} was but a transitory palliative: by 212 minting of the coins had ceased altogether. After Trasimene in 217 Rome sought to boost morale by dipping into her precious stock of gold: she issued a few staters, her earliest coins in that metal. For propaganda they depicted the solemn determination of Roman and non-Roman Italy to remain firmly united against Hannibal’s onslaught. Another expedient quickly adopted by Rome was to use the coins of other states, even those of Carthage, overstriking them with mint and value marks of her own.

The great crisis came in 213. By then not only was Capua ranged against Rome, but notable Italiote centres as well – Thurii, Heraclea, Metapontum, and Tarentum (apart from its citadel). In addition, Philip V of Macedon and the leaders of Syracuse had entered the war against her, and the failure of Syphax’s revolt in Africa was freeing Punic troops for use against the Scipios in Spain. All this meant that in 212 Rome would need to field even bigger armies, amounting in all to twenty-five legions, and besides they would have to maintain powerful naval forces in the Adriatic. These called for unprecedented financial outlays. But the sacrifice was worth making. Syracuse was captured, Capua recovered, and Macedon tamed. War booty and the improved strategic balance brought ample supplies of metal, and from 211 on Rome was able to put enormous numbers of coins into circulation. They included vast quantities of the new sextantal \textit{as}, but also coins of silver and gold. Hence it looks as if Rome used the occasion for a drastic overhaul of her currency system.

The \textit{as} remained the unit of reckoning, but the silver and gold issues were carefully brought into close relationship with it. The silver unit became Rome’s most celebrated coin, the \textit{denarius}: its name and its X marking proclaimed it officially equivalent to ten \textit{asses}. The gold pieces were in three denominations, weighing one, two, and three scruples, with marks to show that they were worth twenty, forty, and sixty \textit{asses} respectively. Rome also resumed the practice of putting distinctive silver coins into circulation in southern Italy. For this purpose she used the so-called \textit{victorius}: it was slightly lighter than the \textit{denarius} and bore no mark of value; being only half the weight of the defunct \textit{quadrigatus} that it replaced, it was obviously intended as the equivalent of one drachma.

The new system proved durable. In the years after 211 shortages of silver did occasionally oblige Rome to trim a little the weight of both the \textit{denarius} and the \textit{victorius}. But she did not need to make any more radical changes in her currency during the war, least of all after success in Spain made large stocks of metal available. Actually the reorganization of her coinage system c.211 turned out to be a momentous step. For the \textit{denarius} quickly established its superiority over all other coins in Italy: it was used, or imitated, everywhere.\textsuperscript{317} It did not by itself, of course, romanize the country, but by accustomed Italians to Roman standards and methods of reckoning it helped to make them receptive to other Roman ideas and practices. Their economic activities and those of the Romans became inextricably mixed up and their social life was transformed in the process.

The changes brought by war were not confined to the material sphere. The spiritual life of Italy was affected too, and the new directions it followed were largely Roman in inspiration and guidance.

The Romans themselves were loth to believe that their early disasters at Hannibal’s hands were due to their own iniquity or unpreparedness. They attributed them to divine wrath. Somehow they had lost the favour of heaven and it was essential for them to regain the \textit{pax deorum}. The allies inevitably shared this concern, for their religious attitudes were not fundamentally different. Indeed many of their cults and rituals were similar to, if not identical with, those of the Romans. Therefore the Italians too were anxious to re-establish a right relationship with the supernatural powers.

The prevailing anxiety and unease sought relief in widespread resort to mysticism, astrology, and all sorts of other irrational and superstitious practices. The Roman state itself set the example by assiduously cultivating and even importing religious rites that it hoped would be propitiatory.\textsuperscript{318} Traditional cults, revived where necessary, were scrupulously observed and new and sometimes outlandish ones were hopefully introduced. Omens and prodigies were vigilantly noted and carefully expiated. Supplications were proclaimed, erring Vestals punished, temples dedicated. The rite of the sacred spring,Italic in inspiration but made Roman for the occasion, was resuscitated. The \textit{lectisternium} ritual was introduced from the Greek world, the worship of Magna Mater from the
Asiatic. The god Apollo and his Sybils' utterances were invested with exceptional significance. There was even resort to human sacrifice, care being taken, however, to select victims who were not Roman, Latin or Italic.319

It is clear from Livy that Roman and non-Roman Italy alike were prey to superstitious preoccupations, and in such a spiritual climate the measures adopted by the stronger were bound to serve as models for its dependants.

Rome's language could hardly fail to gain from her assumption of political, military, economic and spiritual leadership throughout the crisis. Unquestionably there had been a gradual spread of Latin before the year 218, even though lack of evidence makes it impossible to trace in all its details. In southern Etruria the conciliaula on the soil of Veii are not the only settlements to have yielded Latin documents. Funerary inscriptions in Latin of the early third century, or even earlier, have also been found on the soil of Catre. Surviving inscriptions similarly testify to some Latinization in the districts inhabited by Sabini and Marsi, the result, no doubt, of the establishment of Rome's corridor across central Italy. The effect now of the Hanniballic War was to bring it into districts where it would otherwise have penetrated much more slowly. It is to be noted that Livy alludes to the language situation in Italy much more frequently in his account of the Second Punic War than in his account of any other period. He records how Hannibal got into trouble at Casilinus through linguistic difficulties and himself tried to exploit language differences to spring a surprise at Salapia. The Romans for their part were on their guard against being betrayed by language: after capturing Hasdrubal's messengers they provided them with an Oscan-speaking escort when sending them through Sabellian districts for further interrogation.320

Hitherto the common people in non-Latin districts had probably had few occasions in their daily lives to use Latin, or even to hear it spoken much. But even in ordinary times, and still more during the Hanniballic crisis, no Italian community could afford to be without persons who knew the language, especially in influential positions. It was essential to maintain close relations with the paramount power if local interests were not to suffer. This was especially true in time of war. Quite ordinary Italians were bound then to be brought into contact with Latin, even though they were serving in their own cohorts or turmae. The officers of those units needed some know-

IV THE IMPACT OF THE PUNIC WARS

ledge of Latin in order to communicate with their Roman superiors; and it would be surprising if the rank and file failed to pick up some smattering from the Roman legionaries.

The thirty Latin colonies had also had time to help spread the language.321 By 200 Brundisium was diffusing Latin in the Messapian region to judge from the dedication, in Latin, of a temple to a Roman-type divine triad at Manduria; and within a few years Quintus Ennius of Rudiae would be producing Rome's first epic poem. Ariminum seems to have performed a similar function in the north. At any rate, nearby Umbrian (?) Sarsina could make its own gift to Latin letters in the person of Ennius' contemporary, the comic playwright Plautus. Latin literature was fairly launched.
CHAPTER V

THE HEGEMONY OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC

The capitulation of Carthage brought power and prestige to Rome, but it did not bring peace. Hannibal’s adventure had loosened Roman control of upper Italy and, spurred on by his brother Mago and other Punic officers, Gauls and Ligures remained in arms there even after the Carthaginian surrender.

Hannibal had demonstrated to the Romans that the Alps, far more than the Appennines, were the true natural rampart for Italy, and they could see for themselves how upper Italy might serve as a base for overland operations beyond Italy, whether westwards towards friendly Massilia and their new possessions in Spain or eastwards towards hostile Macedon and the Hellenistic monarchies. Rome, therefore, moved at once to reimpose her authority on the far north, even at the cost of continuing warfare.

The Gauls resisted fiercely, their innate pugnacity now exacerbated by the desperate consciousness that it was a battle for survival. Even Rome’s allies among the Celts, the Cenomani, joined the struggle against her for a short period between 200 and 190. That decade opened with the sack of Placentia, the Latin Colony that had remained impregnable throughout Hannibal’s war. It closed with the submission of the Boii, the last of the Gauls to surrender.

The Romans were thus left free to deal with the Ligures further west, much more stubborn enemies than the Gauls. Some Ligures are said to have remained in arms even down to Augustus’ day, although most of their tribes had been conquered by the year 150. Not that the Romans had by then brought the Alps under their control: for the next hundred years and more they could not even use the mountain passes except on payment of transit tolls to the mountaineer tribes.

Simultaneously with their reassertion of control over Cisalpinia, the Romans were restoring their authority in peninsular Italy. They

had already shown at Capua in 210 what was in store for Italian supporters of Hannibal; and, as soon as Carthage made peace, they proceeded to the grim work of punishment. Some Italians were executed, others sold into slavery, and yet others deprived of their property. Rome also resumed her earlier practice of seizing land from guilty communities, but she did not revive her policy of wholesale incorporations; so far as is known, no community was annexed with partial, much less with full Roman citizenship. Nor does Rome appear to have distributed any of the territory she confiscated to her allies, although she did use some for Latin Colonies. Evidently the escape of the allies from Punic domination was to constitute its own reward.

The territory seized was mostly in the south, Sabelli (with the notable exception of the Pentrian Samnites) being the principal sufferers. Not that the Italiotes and Messapii escaped scot free. The archaeological evidence suggests that even where the native inhabitants were not ruthlessly expelled impoverishment and depopulation were likely to be common.

Some of the confiscated land was quickly transformed into Latin-speaking country by being distributed to demobilized Roman soldiers, either viri lim or in coloniae, a few of which were of the Latin variety. But a certain amount of it was retained as Roman state domain so that it could be leased out and contribute thus to Roman public revenues. In Campania the land leased was predominantly agricultural, but elsewhere much of it was devoted to pastoralism. The lessees (possessores) were Romans for the most part, but did include some Italians and even perhaps some of the original owners. The enterprises of the lessees required more than a little capital, but of this there was no shortage in second-century Italy. For, besides consolidating her position in both upper and peninsular Italy, Rome was soon drawn into conflicts of the Hellenistic world and within fifty-three years had made herself mistress of the entire Mediterranean basin. The profits and opportunities from her overseas empire in the form of booty, bullion, slaves, reparations, tribute and commercial exploitation brought a steady flow of wealth into Italy. The accumulation of investment-seeking capital there was enormous and it led to a marked growth of the commercial class.

The effect of all this on the life and economy of Italy was dramatic. Social changes were inevitable in second-century Italy in any event, owing to the diffusion of Hellenistic influences through-
out the Mediterranean world. But in Italy their speed and scale were breathtaking. Subsistence agriculture on small holdings tended to get replaced by cash crop farming of huge estates. In the south there was a massive increase of transhumant pastoralism, a development with sinister implications since the flocks were mostly tended for absentee owners by armed slaves who were little better than brigands and made living conditions so unbearable that the freeborn natives drifted elsewhere. In many regions peasant farmers were a vanishing breed.324

Generalizations, however, are misleading. Conditions varied greatly from one part of Italy to another. Sturdy peasants and yeomen did not disappear everywhere by any means, and many areas of the Italian countryside remained populous and agriculturally productive. There is abundant archaeological evidence for the prosperous condition of Latium and Campania (even including Capua) in the second century.325 Even in the south Hannibal's devastation and Rome's vengeance had not brought complete ruin and depopulation, though the freeborn population did dwindle sharply in Apulia, Lucania and Bruttium. Nor had deforestation as yet brought its desolation nor malaria its ravages.

The mistress of Italy was in an advantageous position to exploit the changed conditions. Rome had emerged from the Hannibalic ordeal relatively stronger than the Italian states, and the morale and self-confidence of her governing class now exceeded all bounds. She proceeded to extend her power and influence; and, as her stature grew, her Italian allies became ever more palpably her dependants.

Profiting from her war-time tradition of leadership, Rome continued automatically to play the larger role that the conflict had thrust upon her, and the Italians, although no longer constrained by the proximity of peril to accept her fias without protest, had nevertheless to conform to them. She was in a position to ignore complaints and impose her will as she saw fit.

Where she was most likely to issue orders was in connection with military activities and the peninsula being now pacified (except for some Ligurian areas) this often meant service abroad. The allies must have resented this, for no matter how ready they might be to help defend Italy and even to recognize that operations at either end of the Mediterranean kept Hellenistic monarchs and other possible enemies at a safe distance, many of Rome's enterprises must have struck them as imperialist adventuring.

V THE HEGEMONY OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC

Nor were Rome's orders confined to the military sphere. As self-appointed guardian of law and order in Italy, she was always ready to stamp out 'conspiracies' wherever she claimed to find any. Thus, social unrest in Etruria and Bacchanalian cultists everywhere could be suppressed as dangerous to the communal well-being; and other cases of high-handed Roman interference in the internal affairs of non-Roman communities in the second century are not hard to find.326 Her actions might be well intentioned, as for instance when she took energetic measures to minimize the effects of floods, fires, famines, earthquakes and other natural disasters of a wide-ranging kind. But such paternalism tended to sap the spirit of independence and self-reliance of the Italian communities.

Rome now bestrode Italy like a colossus. The Second Punic War, like any great conflict, had enhanced both the material power and the moral authority of the state that had directed the winning side, and Rome, whether consciously seeking to do so or not, could now hardly help impressing Italy with her character, her speech and her customs. Even Cisalpina, which now began to be brought firmly within the Roman system, was not immune.

In fact, the conquest of Cisalpina was by now far enough advanced for the Romans to organize it to suit their own interests. As usual they decided to 'divide and rule' and to vary their treatment of the conquered. Their arrangements in the two areas into which upper Italy is divided by the river Po differed sharply.

South of the Po, in today's Romagna, Emilia and Liguria, Rome confiscated large tracts of territory. For the Gauls the consequences were overwhelming. The Lingones simply vanished and never again played any part in the history of Italy. The Boii, although they did not completely disappear, also suffered heavily. A good half of their territory was seized and many of its inhabitants slain or expelled. But a certain remnant of the tribe, the young and the elderly according to Livy, seem to have been left as subject allies on a low-lying area in and around Brixellum (the Ager Boicis of Festus).327

Much of Cispadana,328 like Cisalpina in general, consisted of undrained marshes and uncleared forests, and before 200 it could not have been really densely settled: indeed, in some areas it may not have been properly settled at all. There would thus be plenty of land available for new settlers provided that it could be made habitable. First, however, it had to be made secure.

The Roman instrument for this purpose was, of course, the
colonies, and Rome at once reinforced the two Latin Colonies already on the Po, Placentia and Cremona. She also planned some new colonies. No doubt she would have preferred them, too, to be coloniae Latinae, but by now there was difficulty in finding settlers for colonies of this sort. The calls upon Roman manpower immediately after Hannibal's war were heavy. Men were needed to strengthen old colonies and to found new ones in peninsular Italy, and the armies in Macedon and elsewhere were also calling for men. Besides this, native Romans realized how valuable their citizenship had become, and they were reluctant to surrender it merely to obtain allotments in Latin Colonies, least of all in a region as distant, difficult and dangerous as Cisalpina. The offer of huge parcels of land (50 ingera a man and even more for equites) succeeded in attracting 3,000 volunteers for Latin Colonies in the Boian lands. Many of them, it may be suspected, were non-Romans; indeed to judge from the name of the colony that was founded, Bononia (thought to derive from the Celtic word meaning 'base' or 'foundation'), some of them may even have been Gauls. In any case, 3,000 settlers barely sufficed for this one colony, which was established in 189 on the key site of Erruscan Felsina controlling the Raticosa pass across the Appennines. Ultimately Bononia became a very fine city, but at its foundation it was the smallest Latin Colony recorded since Cales and Luceria in the fourth century; and even its comparatively modest number of settlers could not at this time be found for a projected second colony in Cispadana, and the plan for one had to be dropped. 329

Additional Latin Colonies being thus out of the question, the Romans resorted to colonies of the citizen variety. Such colonies hitherto had been miserable affairs on the sea coast peopled by a handful of settlers endowed with the barest minimum of land; and such establishments were hardly indicated as bastions for the protection of Roman territory in the north. Accordingly the Romans devised Citizen Colonies of a radically different sort, comparable in all respects, except their citizenship, to Latin Colonies. They would not be confined to the littoral and they would be agrarian rather than maritime settlements. Their settlers would be numerous, all enjoying Roman citizenship, a feature bound to attract Italian volunteers and render it unnecessary to offer allotments on the Bononian scale. Even so, the parcels of land, although modest, were more than twice as large as those in the old coloniae maritimae.

V THE HEGEMONY OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC

The first pair of such new model Citizen Colonies were probably Potentia and Pisauro in 184. They were established south of Ariminum in the Ager Gallicus, a part of Cisalpina in Roman eyes. The settlers each received six ingera of land, but how many of them there were is not recorded. The next year two more Citizen Colonies were founded, both north of the Appennine watershed, at Mutina and Parma in the region now known as Emilia. Each consisted of 2,000 settlers and the allotments were five and eight ingera respectively. These colonies were, no doubt, intended to control the northern approaches to the Abetone and Cisa passes.

The Romans also now brought the Ligures living west of the river Trebia on both sides of the Appennines under their sway. Some Ligurian tribes fell victim to the unprovoked assaults of Roman commanders hungry for 'triumphs'. Others were forced to leave their mountain strongholds and occupy less defensible sites, as far away as Samnium in the case of the Apuani. 330 The Romans may have seized less land from the Ligures than from the Cispadane Gauls, but even so it was extensive, stretching to the Monferrato region and the river Stura. Here, too, the Romans had difficulty in finding recruits for Latin Colonies and, as amongst the Boii, were able to found only one. This was at Luca in 180. Another colony three years later at Luna, where each of the 2,000 settlers seems to have received six and a half ingera of land, had to be of the citizen variety. Both of these Ligurian colonies were south of the Appennine watershed, but they were nevertheless serviceable bases for the deeper penetration of northwest Italy, 331 and it was perhaps to this end that communications with them across Etruria had been strengthened a few years earlier with Citizen Colonies at Saturnia and Gravisca, in 183 and 181 respectively.

All the coloniae were quickly linked to Rome by military highways whose construction called for grading and ditch-digging, as well as for paving, and helped to drain many of the marshes that had proved so formidable an obstacle to easy movement in the Po valley in Hannibal's day.

With provision thus made for defence, and land reclamation taken in hand, 332 closer settlement became possible, and thousands of new settlers were brought to Cisalpina and allotted land south of the Po. From the many towns that later bore the title of forum one can reasonably postulate a succession of virilite distributions. 333 But only one, that of 173, is actually recorded. It has left abundant traces
of centuriation and they indicate that it was a very large operation, extending from the Celtic areas in the east to the Ligurian districts further west, perhaps as far as the neighbourhood of Dertona. There was so much land available that now, perhaps for the first time, non-Romans participated in a Roman virgata distribution. The non-Romans (who were Laeti) received only three iugera apiece as compared with the ten given to Romans and, as far as is known, they did not get Roman citizenship as a result of the operation. But there is no record of their resenting the discrimination nor any account of how they survived on such meagre holdings. The Roman beneficiaries of 173 seem all to have been registered in the Tribe Pollia.334

Some sections of Cispadana still contained ostensibly independent, sovereign communities. Umbrian (?) Ravenna, for instance, is known to have had a treaty with Rome, and the same must also be true of Sarsina, it too probably an Umbrian community. As already noted, the Boii in and around Brixellum also seem to have been attached (or, to use the Latin expression, 'attributed') to nearby Roman or Latin communities that supervised their administration without formally annexing them.

The Romans called the peoples living north of the Po Transpadana, perhaps to indicate that they constituted a special category: they were certainly treated very differently from the natives south of the river.

The Veneti continued to be allies of Rome, after 200 as well as before it. Rome also reached an amicable understanding with Etruscan Mantua. The Cenomani were also old allies but not equally reliable, and were consequently accorded less respect. After their abortive move against Rome in 200 they were disarmed in 197 and forced into a very unequal alliance. The same fate befell the Insules a year later.

Thus, from the beginning of the second century, all of the Transpadane peoples east of the river Ticinus were allies of Rome, autonomous in local matters, but clearly subject to the Roman hegemony. They supplied troops when Rome called for them, they submitted to Roman arbitration when they quarrelled, and sometimes they even had to tolerate Roman interference in their internal affairs. The dependent status of the Gauls was even made explicit in their treaties, since these stipulated that no Cenomani or Insules were ever to become Roman citizens, an exclusion ostensibly reassuring the Celts against inroads on their manpower,

but more probably due to Celtophobia.335 The latter may also explain why a group of central European Celts that sought to settle peacefully in Venezia Giulia was ejected by the Romans in 186 and barred from any renewal of their incursion by a Latin Colony established at Aquileia in 181.336

Rome did not seize any land in northeastern Transpadana. There were no virgata distributions there and of the two Latin Colonies one (Cremona) dated from before the Second Punic War and the other (Aquileia) was not on territory taken from Italians: it lay in the no man's land between the Veneti and their (Celtic?) enemies, the Carni.

In the region west of the Ticinus, on the other hand, the Romans did confiscate land. Here the Celtic and Ligurian tribes remained in arms much longer than the other Cisalpine peoples, either because they were less accessible or because the Roman conquest was more desultory.

Roman seizure of territory in what is today called Piemonte began as early as the first half of the second century. The areas seized are not specified, but they evidently included at least some of the district known today as the Lomellina, immediately north of the Po near modern Verceil. It was probably here that Rome in 172 settled the 'many thousands' of Ligures victimized by the unscrupulous M. Popilius Laenas. Other Ligures also got land from the Romans. According to the Elder Pliny, who, however, supplies no details, distributions were made to the Ingauni on no fewer than thirty occasions.337 Not that Lomellina became thoroughly Ligurian; the peg-top jars (vasi a trotella) found there in some quantity provide evidence of Celtic inhabitants.

No record whatever survives of the submission of the Taurini to Roman authority. The Salassi, immediately to their north, came under assault by Ap. Claudius Pulcher in 143, ostensibly to prevent them from diverting the water of the river Cervo (?), but more probably to get control of the nearby gold-mines of Victumulace, which the Romans were certainly exploiting a few years later.

Piemonte remained a war theatre throughout the second century, and by its end Rome had pushed her dominion forward in the far northwest to the foothills of the Alps.

Although largely pacified and organized, and although inhabited by many Roman citizens, Cisalpina remained distinct from the peninsula to the south. Officially it was Gallia, even though
conceded to be geographically a part of Italy. As a war zone in which Roman armies were needed almost every year throughout the second century, Cisalpina is depicted as a sort of provincial area, and, in fact, early in the first century, it was officially pronounced a Roman province. But whatever its political vicissitudes, romanization made the same steady headway there as in the rest of Italy.

In all parts of Italy Rome’s economic predominance was as conspicuous as her military and political. The common view of the Roman ruling class, as more or less indifferent to economic considerations when framing state policy, can be very misleading. No state when contemplating a course of action deliberately ignores the probable material outcome of its decision, and it is inconceivable that the Romans did so. But, even if Rome’s rulers had been largely unmoved by such factors, they could not have escaped the consequences of their own supremacy. Their hegemony was bound to extend into trade and commerce owing to the economic advantage that political power always brings. In the second century it enabled Rome to suspend direct taxation of her own citizens. The burgesses of other states were probably not so lucky, although they too must have reaped some benefit from the wealth that reached Italy from Rome’s overseas empire and percolated into its remotest corners.

With by far the largest single concentration of population, Rome by her very size set the pattern and determined the volume of all mercantile activity, and the many entrepreneurs and business men from non-Roman Italy behaved just like Romans at Delos and elsewhere, and were actually mistaken for such. Rome had become the world centre of capitalism.

The economic domination of Rome is clearly indicated by the common use of Roman coins in non-Roman Italy, ultra-Roman though their types were. Native issues did not disappear, but they lost ground steadily to Roman, especially those of silver. Rome’s coins now circulated everywhere; and her new coins were now all on a Roman standard, since she soon stopped issuing any of a special type for use in hellenized districts. By c. 170 minting of the victorius had ceased and, even though victorii continued to circulate in Cisalpina and elsewhere, they were henceforth reckoned as worth only two sestertii, clear proof that Italy was not only using Rome’s coins, but had also adopted the Roman method of reckoning and pricing. By 141 the sestertius was everywhere the normal unit of account and prices were regularly quoted in it, though actual

sestertius pieces do not seem to have been minted and therefore could not have been in circulation until forty years later.338

Well engineered and solidly paved traffic arteries carried the Roman military, political, economic and social presence even into the more recondite parts of Italy during the second century.339 Thus, three roads crossed Etruria from south to north. The most easterly of them, the Via Cassia from Rome to Arretium, may date from 187. It is usually reckoned earlier than the middle road, the Via Clodia, which traversed central Etruria and may have been built c. 183 at the instance of the politically dominant Claudius Marcellus to service Saturnia, the newly founded Citizen Colony. The third road, the Via Aurelia along the Tyrrenian coast, could belong to the third century, being named perhaps after the censor for 241; but it was extended in the second century by the Via Aemilia Scuri of 109, which started at Vada Volaterrana, followed the Ligurian coast to Vada Sabatia and then ran north via Aquae Statiellae to Dertona deep inside Cisalpina. By 109 Cisalpina had an extensive network of highways and they were linked to the road system of the peninsula. A paved extension of the Via Flaminia had been built northwards from Ariminum to Placentia in 187; it replaced an earlier, unpaved road and was named the Via Aemilia after the consul for the year. It serviced Bononia, Mutina, Forum Lepidi,340 and Parma, and its impact was such that to this day the district is known as Emilia. At Bononia the Via Aemilia joined a second Via Flaminia, built by the other consul for 187, the son of the man responsible for the original Via Flaminia of 220: this second Via Flaminia went south across the Appennines to join the Via Cassia at Arretium; and soon it was extended northwards as well to Aquileia, with the result that this Latin Colony was linked to Rome by continuous highway.

Many other roads are recorded in the second century. One of them ran down the Adriatic coast; its name is not known, but it was obviously of great importance and may date from before the year 200. A second Via Aemilia, of the same date as its Cisalpine homonym, followed the route of the later Via Traiana across Samnium to reach the lower Adriatic. The consul of 148 built a road, named after him the Via Postumia, from allied Genua across the Giovi pass to Dertona. Dertona became a nodal point of great importance in the heart of Cisalpina.341 It was linked to Placentia (by an extension of the original Via Aemilia in 148 or earlier), to Pollentia (by a Via Fulvia, perhaps in 125), and to Vada Sabatia on the Ligurian
coast (by the already mentioned Via Aemilia Scavi). Two Viae Popiliae (of 133 BC), one from Capua to Rhegium and the other from Ariminum to Aquileia, seem quickly to have been renamed Viae Anniae, after the consul for 128, who probably not only completed them but also built yet another Via Annia (in the vicinity of Falerii). A road into the interior from Pisa may belong to 123; it was called the Via Quinctia and named after the consul for that year. A Via Caecilia (of 117 BC) that branched off the Via Salaria and reached the centre of the Adriatic coast by way of Amiternum is also recorded.

The roads helped Rome not only to maintain law and order, but also to carry her customs into all parts of Italy, including the Po valley. She became, as Cicero notes,\(^{342}\) the cultural leader as well as the political mistress, and it is this that largely accounts for the speed with which the Hellenistic civilization penetrated all Italy. Greek influence, by no means negligible even in prehistoric times, had become much more marked during the heyday of Magna Graecia, and not least in Rome: in the opinion of fourth-century Greek observers the city actually resembled an Hellenic polis. But, from the late third century on, the operations of the Romans had brought them into direct contact with the kingdoms of Alexander the Great's successors east of the Adriatic and exposed them, and through them the whole of Italy, to the full impact of the world they found in and around the Aegean. Hellenistic sculpture, painting and architectural details, Hellenistic writing and modes of thought came to be quickly noted and eclectically imitated at Rome, and Rome's hegemony ensured their rapid transmission into other parts of Italy.\(^{343}\) The country became a sort of western reflection of the Aegean world with Roman overtones and grew culturally much more homogeneous. From 200 on art becomes a very uncertain guide for differentiating one Italian people from another.

In Italy the Roman peace made for an active and continuous social and economic development, observable above all in the gradual but steady growth of rural settlements into centres of greater consequence and of more monumental aspect.

The inspiration clearly came from Rome. The many new temples, for instance, owed much to her example.\(^{344}\) Naturally this is best illustrated in Roman or Latin Italy, in places like Civitella or Monterinaldo in Picenum where there were structures with magnificent sculptured pediments that could vie with the new basilicas rising around the Roman Forum, or like Cosa in Etruria.
4 Limestone relief of a (transhumant?) shepherd of the Sabelli. Primitive art from rustic Italy, 3rd-1st century.

5 The Hernici of Feronitum built their town wall with both squared and polygonal blocks as can be seen from this arched gateway, the so-called Porta Sanguinaria.

6 Small head in terracotta from the country of the Arquii. The Italic peoples seem to have attached great importance to such votive representations of the human head. 3rd century? From Carsoli.

7 Terracotta votive head similar in date and provenance to the preceding, but more obviously 'classical' in appearance. It illustrates feminine head-dress among the Arquii.

8 The polygonal wall protecting the citadel at Arpinum of the Volsci was pierced by this pointed gateway. The Gothic effect was achieved by corbelling.
9 The Aurunci greatly venerated the goddess Marica, the mother of King Latinus according to Virgil. This votive statuette in terracotta from her shrine near the mouth of the river Liris dates from prehistoric times.

10 Votive head in terracotta recently found at Teanum of the Sidicini. The tall head-covering and the curls are typical of the region. 6th-4th century.


12 For several centuries the Campanians of Capua dedicated crude, stereotyped, statues of tufa, representing a seated kourotrophes with one or many more swaddled infants on her lap. She may be the goddess of fertility or the matron donor. This specimen dates from c. 400.

13 This 3rd-century tomb-painting from Cumae shows a woman and her attendant, a scene familiar from Greek vase-painting. But the florid treatment is very Campanian.

14 Campanian metope in tufa found near the triangular forum in Pompeii with an unusual representation of Athena brandishing workmen's tools. The other figures may be Hephaestus nailing Ixion to the wheel. 3rd century?
15 Aligned Samnite tetraSTYLE temples at Schiavi d'Abruzzo in the country of the Pentri. They face southeast, like those at Pietrabondante, and belong to the 2nd century. The smaller and more recent one without a podium was built by G. Papius (? the Samnite commander in the Social War).

16 Recomposed section of the entablature of the larger and earlier Samnite temple at Schiavi d'Abruzzo. Although the frieze is Doric, the temple columns were Ionic. 2nd century.

18 Small wooden head from the sanctuary of Mefitis at the Vale of Amsaetcus in the country of the Hirpini Samnites. c. 300?

19 Mefitis, as the provider of water and protectress of the fields and flocks, was also a great favourite of the Lucani. Their chief sanctuary to her at Rossano di Vaglio, seen here from the air, was in use from c. 350 to c. 50.

17 Typical three-disc Samnite corselet, probably of the 4th century. The common view that this type of cuirass developed out of the prehistoric one-disc heart protector is false.

20 Bronze figurine of Hercules and a snake (hydra?) from the country of the Lucani. The Italic peoples were very fond of Hercules. 4th century.
21. The tomb-paintings of the Lucani show many scenes of gladiatorial combat, often with gruesome details. This one from Paestum dates from c. 300 or a little later.

22. Coins inscribed with the name Sinthus in Greek suggest that this people may have been organized in a federal state. They copy Greek issues. This early 3rd-century tetradrachm shows obv. the head of Amphitrite, and rev. Poseidon, naked, with his right foot on top of an Ionic column.

23. This fragmentary relief was found on the territory of the Messapi. Obviously Hellenistic in inspiration, it may be the work of Italic craftsmen. Early 3rd century. From Lecce.

24. The potters of Apulia adhered for centuries to their own traditions. The 'tricolla' ware of the Messapi is named after the discs on the handles. This vase from Rudee belongs to the 5th or 4th century.

25. The vases of the Daunii were likely to have eccentric shapes and distinctive decoration. The above specimen is from Canusium; c. 500.

26. No less eccentric were the askoi of the Daunii, smothered with plastic decoration. From Canusium; c. 300.

27. The pottery of the Peuceti was less flamboyant. It includes black Gnathian ware, like the oenochoe shown here decorated with Erotes among flowers and tendrils. 350–300.
28 In Apulia even vases of a conventional type had their own characteristic aspect. This large volute crater by the Darius Painter shows on side (a) the death of Hippolytus, and on side (b) the standard representation of a shrine, this one with a seated figure and offerings. From Rubi; c. 335.

29 Typical 4th-century Apulian lebes, decorated with a Dionysiac scene and symposium, and with a frieze of figures on the lid. From Rubi.

30 Bronze knucklebone which probably served as an Osca pendant weight (13 ozs/379 gms). The partly defaced inscription in the Osca alphabet reveals that it belonged to the Fabantae. First published in 1968.

31 Bronze statuette representing a woman of the MAREGAEI, wearing local costume, who is making an offering to a divinity. From Rapino. Date unknown.

32 Ovid came from a prominent family of the PAELIGNI. This inscription, in Paellignian dialect but Latin script, commemorates his kinsman, Obellius Ovidius, son of Lucius. From Pentinia. 1st century.

33 Inscription of the cismontane Vestini from Petnium, which had become a Roman praefectura administrated by three local acies, here named. The dialect is Vestinian, written in an early Latin alphabet; c. 200.
34 A favourite deity of the Marsi was Angitia, healer of snake-bites. Her shrine stood in a sacred grove near Luso dei Marsi, where its remains can still be seen.

35 Red figure kylix of the Faliscii. The two figures are probably Dionysus and Ariadne. The inscription reads, from right to left, hora vino piparo cra carabo (="loco nimium beban cras carabo": in effect, drink and be merry for tomorrow we’re dead). From Falerii Veteres. 4th century.

36 The so-called Porta di Giove at Falerii Novi. The town wall, as at Latin Cosa earlier in the century, was strengthened with towers; but for the Faliscan town squared masonry was used, not polygonal. 3rd century.

37 Bronze currency bar of the umbri: the inscription is probably the name of its owner (Fucius Sestinitus). The bull in relief confirms Pliny’s assertion that the aes sigillum had herd animals stamped on it. 3rd century.

38 Symbolic of the cultural independence of prehistoric Punicum, and of the readiness of its inhabitants to defend it, is this richly decorated bronze helmet: when worn it had two crests. From Pittino di San Severino.

39 The spiral disc hanging from this pectoral were much used for personal adornment in pre-Roman Punicum: they remained in vogue for centuries. From Canavaccio.
40. Rectangular stone houses of the Veneti at the hill fort on Monte Bignone.

41. The *stelae* of the Veneti are typical of their production at Ateste and of their continuing use of orientalizing design as late as the Boldù-Dolfin specimen shown here, of the 4th century.

42. Votive bronze tablet of the Veneti, probably depicting their goddess Reitia, 4th or 3rd century. From Caldevigo, near Este.

43. The Veneti were much involved with the breeding and training of horses, as this votive tablet from Ateste illustrates, 4th or 3rd century.

44. Stone *stelai* have been found among the Veneti only at Patavium. On this one two horse-soldiers are seen trampling a decapitated enemy. Late 4th century.

45. Bronze *Celtic* helmet, with incised decoration and an iron crest. Probably 4th century.


47. Warrior *Gauls*, nude except for their torques, belts, shields and the *chlamys* on the one on the left. They are in flight after sacking a sanctuary, symbolized by the *patena* and overturned vase at their feet. From the frieze of the 2nd-century temple at Civitalse.
48 Inscription of the LEPONTII, found in 1966 at Prestino in Lombardy. It is probably on an architrave and may belong to the 1st century. The retrograde writing, when transposed, reads: UVAMOKOZIS; PILIAPOU; UVITAIHOPOS; ABHONEPOS; SITIS: TETU and may mean 'Uxamogostis Pliaques dedicated the sanctuary to ? ?' (the third and fourth words being dative plurals).

49 Remains of a stone house of the RAETI at Montesei di Serio, near Trento.

50 Inscribed stags' horns from a shrine of the RAETI at Magrè, northwest of Vicenza. The writing is left to right on the middle one, right to left on the other two, and seems to consist exclusively of names apart from the last word on the second and third, tiumhe (Etruscan ziune?). 3rd century or later.

51 Donarius of the Social War insurgents, symbolizing the struggle between Roma (the wolf) and Italia (in Oscan vitelia; cf. Latin vitulus: the bull). In the exergue (in Oscan): G. Papius, the name of the Samnite commander.

51 Another symptom of ubiquitous Roman influence was the political terminology. The titles aedilis and questor were adopted in many parts of Italy, and local councils were likely to be called senatus, even in Samnium. The constitutional nomenclature is patently Roman even in its distinguishing epithets.

51 From the wholesale conversion of partial citizens into full ones, the spread of Roman law and Roman social attitudes can confidently be postulated. It is generally agreed that most, if not all, the Italian communities incorporated originally without the vote had acquired full citizen rights by c. 100; and from the Sabine precedent of 268 one can argue that this upgrading presupposed some degree of romanization. Admittedly after the Sabini only one occasion is actually recorded when partial citizens were elevated, namely in 188 when Volscian Arpinum, Formiae and Fundi obtained full rights. But this is reported by Livy in so casual and matter-of-fact a fashion as to suggest that promotion to the higher status was normal enough.